D
uring the past decade, a number of East and Central European countries have stabilized their economies, built up the institutions and the legal underpinnings of a market economy, and achieved sustained economic growth. In these c o u n t r i e s, the conduct and objectives of macro e c onomic policy have evo l ved rapidly during this time. Initially, monetary authorities used direct instruments such as credit ceilings and focused on easily understood and highly visible targets such as the nominal exchange rate. As a measure of macroeconomic stabilization was achieved, and with the emergence of the necessary markets and institutions, monetary policy has evolved toward less d i rect instruments such as open-market opera t i o n s and toward new targets such as reducing inflation to West European levels.
In this paper, we examine the experience of t h ree of the more successful transition economies, the Czech Re p u b l i c, Hungary, and Poland. These countries' economic perfo r m a n c e s, whether m e a s u red by the level of inflation or by the re s u m ption of economic growth after the initial shock of t ransition, places them at the fo re f ront of the tra n s ition economies. They will be among the first East E u ropean countries to join the European Union (EU). Indeed, it may appear that their economies are, to a l a rge extent, post-transition economies whose policy o b j e c t i ves and problems are much more like those of the advanced and middle-income market economies of Europe than those of the successor states of the former Soviet Union. Their experience in achiev i n g this status provides valuable lessons for those tra n s ition economies that have, as yet, to develop their m a r kets and their monetary institutions to the same extent as have these three countries.
A key policy objective for the three tra n s i t i o n economies considered in this paper is to reduce their i n flation rates to levels that prevail in the EU. To this end, they are seeking new approaches to fig h t i n g i n flation, with the Czech Republic and Poland fo rmally adopting inflation ta rgeting as their moneta r y p o l i cy re g i m e. Inflation ta rgeting, howeve r, like other m o n e tary policy regimes that seek to influ e n c e prices without re c o u rse to price contro l s, re q u i res a functioning capital market to serve as a mechanism for the transmission of monetary policy. We exa m i n e the efforts to develop such markets in these countries in the next section. In the fo l l owing section, we examine the evolution of monetary policy in each c o u n t r y, highlight the problems that moneta r y authorities have faced, and describe the curre n t a p p roach to managing inflation.
CREATING A BANKING SYSTEM
A key component of the transition in each of the t h ree countries was to create a functioning capita l m a r ket, which, in the case of the Czech Republic and Poland, re q u i red the creation of a two-tier banking s ystem out of the former socialist state bank. The socialist banking system consisted of a state bank that not only performed the functions of a centra l bank, but also issued virtually all short-term cre d i t s to the country's enterprise secto r. There we re also s eve ral subsidiary banks with specialized functions such as financing fo reign trade or servicing households' savings accounts. Credit was granted not on the basis of the cre d i t worthiness of the firms seeking loans but rather on the need to finance activities d e c reed by the central plan.
The Czech Republic
In Cze c h o s l ovakia, the socialist central bank wa s b ro ken up into a two-tier banking system shortly after the fall of the communist re g i m e. The loan p o r t folio of the former central bank was inherited mainly by the largest of the new commercial banks, Ko m e rcní Banka, in the Czech Re p u b l i c, and Vseobecná Úve rová Banka in the Slovak Re p u b l i c. Other commercial banks emerged from the fo r m e r s p e c i a l i zed banks (Desai, 1996, p. 469) . Because of the federal structure of Cze c h o s l ovakia, most of the M A RC H / AP R I L 2 0 0 0 3 1 Ali M. Ku tan is an associate professor of economics at Southern Illinois Unive rs i t y, Edwa rd s v i l l e. Josef C. Brada is a professor of economics at A r i zona State Unive rs i t y. The authors acknowledge financial support of the National Council for Eurasian and East European Re s e a rch. This paper was written while Ali M. Ku tan was a visiting scholar at the Fe d e ral Re s e r ve Bank of St. Lo u i s. The authors thank Mike Dueke r, Bill Gav i n , and Chris Neely for helpful comments. Judith Hazen provided re s e a rch assista n c e. c o m m e rcial banks carved out from the socialist-era c e n t ral bank and from the specialized banks concent rated their activities in one Republic or the other. T h u s, in 1993, when Cze c h o s l ovakia split into two independent countries, the Czech Republic and the S l ovak Re p u b l i c, the number of active banks in each successor country declined, and each country had to found its own central bank on the basis of the fo r m e r C ze c h o s l ovak National Bank. In the Czech Re p u b l i c, the Czech National Bank (CNB) was established and g i ven the traditional functions of a central bank.
C zech commercial banks held many bad loans that had been made to sta t e -owned firms during the socialist period. Because Ko m e rcní Banka had the biggest share of these loans, its nonperforming loan p roblem was the most serious, and it re c e i ved the bulk of the funds that the government allocated to aiding the commercial banks. Some of the wo rs t loans we re tra n s f e r red to the Consolidation Bank, which was founded precisely to manage such loans. P r i va t i zation had a major impact on the Cze c h banking secto r. Shares of the commercial banks we re auctioned to the public through the vo u c h e r p r i va t i zation, but the government remained the primary owner of each of the major banks. Pe r h a p s m o re important was the fact that each commerc i a l bank set up one or more investment priva t i za t i o n f u n d s, which collected the vo u c h e rs held by citize n s i n to a mutual fund that used these vo u c h e rs to bid for shares of companies undergoing priva t i za t i o n . Because about two -t h i rds of all available vo u c h e rs went to such investment funds, the banks became major ow n e rs of Czech industrial firms and-second only to the controlling shares held by the gove r n m e n t -of each other. Banks have shown a proclivity to m a ke loans to unpro fitable firms in which their i n vestment funds hold large sta ke s. The dominant role of the government in the ow n e rship of the banks has raised questions about the effic i e n cy with which bank credit is allocated by the banking s ys t e m .
1 As a result of these ow n e rship ties betwe e n banks and fir m s, the withdrawal of banks fro m lending to the business sector in favor of lending to the government has been less of a problem in the C zech Republic than it was in Hungary.
The unwillingness of the Czech government to a l l ow fo reign banks to enter the market has compounded the lack of competition caused by the banks' ow n e rship of enterprises and by the domination of the market by a few large banks. New l y founded domestic banks have been too small, subject to disadva n tageous regulation and plagued by scandal. A number have failed, had their license revo ked, or been ta ken over by the large sta t e -ow n e d c o m m e rcial banks (Desai, 1996, pp.479-480) . Although commercial banks have been re q u i red to i n c rease their capita l i zation over time, aided by CNB policies that maintain high spreads between lending and borrowing ra t e s, the financial situation of the c o m m e rcial banks has not improved as much as hoped due to their continued lending to insolve n t c l i e n t s. Many observe rs believe that it will be diffic u l t for the government to find fo reign inve s to rs to ta ke over its majority shares in Czech commercial banks.
Hungary
In Hungary, the state bank was tra n s formed into a two-tier banking system in 1987, prior to the beginning of the transition, as part of ongoing effo r t s to decentra l i ze the economy and to replace the plan with indirect state control over economic activity. The new banking system consisted of the National Bank of Hungary (NBH), which re tained the functions of a traditional central bank, and five new l yo rg a n i zed commercial banks. The commerc i a l banks inherited some of the staff of the former sta t e bank as well as the state bank's loans to sta t e -ow n e d fir m s. Three of the newly created commercial banks had country-wide secto ral mandates: Budapest Bank in industry, Magyar Hitel Bank in agriculture and Ke re z kedelmi Bank in coopera t i ve s, small businesses, and public utilities. The sta t e -owned commerc i a l banks started life underc a p i ta l i zed, with shaky loan p o r t folios and with few incentives to compete with each other, to behave efficiently or even to scre e n against making bad loans ( Bartlett, 1997, pp. 77-79; 10 3 -108) . Neve r t h e l e s s, this early experience with a t wo-tier banking system provided important human and institutional capital for formulating and carrying out monetary policy during the subsequent t ransition period.
The ability of firms to service their loans fro m Hungarian commercial banks deteriorated at the outset of the transition because Hungarian firms suff e red financial losses when their exports to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) disa p p e a red virtually overnight even as domestic 1 For an analysis of Komercní Banka's lending policies, see Snyder and Kormendi (1997) . Desai (1996) provides a more general critique of the Czech banking system's performance and of the government's role as majority owner. spending collapsed. By 1991, about half the comm e rcial banks' loans could be classified as nonperforming (Meyendorff and Snyd e r, 1997) , and, by 1993, the two largest commercial banks we re technically insolvent (Bartlett, 1997, p. 208) , necessitating a series of loan consolidation pro g rams and bank re financings by the sta t e.
Hungary priva t i zed its banking sector primarily by means of sales to fo reign strategic inve s to rs who assumed operating control and could inject additional funds into the banks. Bank priva t i zation wa s d e l ayed by uncertainty about the value of the banks' p o r t folios and their franchise va l u e, but, by the end of 1997, the process was largely complete. The nota b l e exceptions we re Hungary's two largest commerc i a l b a n k s, OTP and Po s tabank; the latter re q u i red a major g overnment bailout in 1998. The gove r n m e n t 's l i b e ral policy towa rd the entry of fo reign banks into Hungary spurred greater competition and improve d the effic i e n cy of the banking system. Neve r t h e l e s s, during the transition period, Hungarian commerc i a l banks we re not effective means of channeling s avings to the corporate secto r. Indeed, in part because of the draconian nature of Hungarian bankr u p tcy laws and in part due to the need to improve their balance sheets, most commercial banks in Hungary reduced their ex p o s u re to Hungarian firms in favor of investments in government securities.
Poland
The socialist banking system in Poland was dismantled in 1989. Four state banks, specialized in fo reign tra d e, household deposits, etc., we re c o n verted into commercial banks. Ad d i t i o n a l l y, the National Bank of Po l a n d 's (NBP's) regional offic e s we re converted into nine commercial banks, each with a network of offices and a client base that wa s c o n c e n t rated in that region (Slay, 1996) . Early on, due to lax supervision and easy-entry conditions, a number of small new banks as well as some fo re i g nowned banks we re founded. Many of these new banks succumbed either to scandal or to their inability to survive poor financial re s u l t s. Subseq u e n t l y, regulations re g a rding the founding of new banks we re toughened.
The government continued as the owner of the l a rge new commercial banks for some time. This wa s due to delays in implementing their priva t i za t i o n t h rough a pro g ram that invo l ved sales of stock to a combination of domestic ow n e rs and fo reign stra t e g i c i n ve s to rs (Abarbanell and Bonin, 1997) . The gove r nment also changed the structure of the industry by consolidating some commercial banks to incre a s e their size and thus make them more competitive with fo reign banks (Bonin and Leven, 1996) . This wa s m o t i vated by the fact that Poland, like the other two c o u n t r i e s, soon will have to re m ove barriers to the entry of banks from EU countries.
Despite the regional orientation of nine of the c o m m e rcial banks-which limits the extent to which t h ey compete with each other and encourages local authorities to press these banks to lend to local fir m s -o b s e r ve rs believe that Polish banks have been re l at i vely successful in cutting ties to unpro fitable fir m s while avoiding a major dive rsion of lending from corp o rate clients to government securities. The fact that economic growth resumed in Poland sooner and m o re vigorously than it did in the Czech Re p u b l i c and in Hungary explains some of this more successful performance of Polish commercial banks.
Summary
All three of the transition economies have made p ro g ress in creating a banking system that corre sponds to the needs of a developed market economy. Their central banks have considerable independence f rom government influence in fo l l owing their mandates to control inflation and maintain the international value of their curre n cy. At the same time, the commercial banking sector remains re l a t i ve l y f ra g i l e, plagued by poor loans made in the past as well as by questionable lending policies that, fo r some banks, continue to the present. These pro b l e m s a re most visible in the Czech Re p u b l i c, but even in Poland and Hungary loan portfolios of individual comm e rcial banks remain pro b l e m a t i c. This weakness of the commercial bank secto r, and its re l a t i vely small role in financing the investment activity of the corporate secto r, limits the policies that central banks can fo l l ow and may attenuate or distort the tra n s m i s s i o n of monetary policy impulses to the economy.
The problems created by the fragility of the commercial bank sector are exacerbated by the underdevelopment of the other components of the capital market. Each of the countries has a stock exchange, but markets for shares are thin, and stock markets have performed poorly since the middle of the decade. More importantly, these stock markets provide few opportunities for raising funds through initial public offerings. Insurance companies and mortgage lending are underdeveloped or remain as monopolies of the state. The relative underdevelopment of the capital markets in these countries is evident when we compare the financial intermediation to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio ((bank assets + stock market capitalization + bond market capitalization) / GDP) for the three transition economies to the EU average. During 1996 this ratio was 162.4 percent for the Czech Republic, 85.9 percent for Hungary, and 63.4 percent for Poland; the corresponding figure for the EU was 288.1 percent (Fink and Haiss, 1999) . Thus, even though modern banking and capital market institutions exist in these countries, they are more fragile and likely to function less effectively than the European Union countries.
MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN TRANSITION
Although the three countries differ in the s tarting conditions and in the details of the policies adopted, there are important similarities in their a p p roach to sta b i l i zation and disinflation. All thre e began the process of transition with distorted domestic prices, unrealistic exchange rates, and open or repressed inflation. The initial objectives of macroeconomic policy were to contain the inflation that would follow from, or be intensified by, the freeing of domestic prices. To make stabilization credible, to facilitate the reorientation of trade to the West, and to underpin a liberal trade regime, nominal exchange rates were set at rates well below purchasing power parity (Halpern and Wyplosz, 1997) . Policymakers expected that domestic inflation would cause real exchangerate appreciation and lead to more realistic exchange rates as these countries came closer to joining the EU.
All three countries experienced a significant decline in production at the outset (Figure 1 ) as a result of the collapse of CMEA trade. This placed a serious burden on fiscal policy because tax revenues declined and the need for a social safety net for the swelling numbers of unemployed increased. Monetary policy was complicated by the fact that investment in plant and equipment decreased as excess capacity emerged in many industries. Many firms failed to respond to the new environment by reducing or altering their output. Instead they accumulated large stocks of inve n to r i e s and corresponding debts that threatened not only their liquidity but also that of their suppliers and of the newly created commercial banks.
O ver time, output re c ove red and inflation declined ( F i g u re 2). Neve r t h e l e s s, this decline has not bro u g h t i n flation in these countries to West European leve l s. T h u s, the current task of monetary policy is to re d u c e i n flation in these countries with moderate levels of i n flation (Cotta relli and Sza p a r y, 1998) to low singledigit levels so that they may pre p a re for entry into the EU. To achieve such disinflation is crucial as it is an important pre requisite for joining the EU. Ye t , tight monetary policy will hamper the ability of the firms in these countries to underta ke the inve s t m e n t s in new equipment and technology that are needed if t h ey are to be competitive on EU marke t s. 
R E V I E W

Czech Republic
The Czech Republic employed a monetary policy based on preserving the nominal exchange rate of the koruna, which was pegged from 1991 to May 1997 to a basket made up of the U.S. dollar and the Deutschmark (DM). The objective of pegging was to help fight inflation by fixing the prices of fo re i g n g o o d s, to make sta b i l i zation policies cre d i b l e, and to a t t ract fo reign capital. The peg undervalued the koruna to allow a period of real appreciation as the domestic inflation rate outpaced that of Germany and the United Sta t e s.
The Czech Republic was able to satisfy three of the four conditions proposed by Williamson (1991 ) for a successful exc h a n g e -rate peg. It was an open e c o n o my; it pegged to the appropriate curre n c i e s because Germany was its main trading partner, and fuel and many raw material imports we re priced in U.S. dollars. Also, its external indebtedness was low and the official government budget flu c t u a t e d b e t ween surpluses and deficits that we re not more than 2 percent of GDP, giving it a credible policy re g i m e. Unfo r t u n a t e l y, the Czech Republic did not satisfy the fourth criterion, that of achieving a rate of i n flation close to those of the United States and Germ a ny. As Figure 2 shows, the initial surge of price i n c reases that fo l l owed market libera l i zation quickly subsided, but inflation persisted around 10 perc e n t for the entire transition period.
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Fiscal policy was underutilized as a policy tool to a c h i eve a lower inflation ra t e, and the fiscal surplus turned to a deficit over the ye a rs, especially if one c o n s i d e rs off-budget ex p e n d i t u res and commitments. C o n s e q u e n t l y, monetary policy had to become i n c reasingly tight to reduce the rate of inflation. At first, the CNB relied on credit re financing quota s and other re l a t i vely direct measures to control the supply of money, although, in general, money -g row t h ta rg e t s we re ove rshot. Over time, more indirect meas u re s, including changes in the re s e r ve ratio, the short-term repo ra t e, and open-market opera t i o n s became the key tools for controlling the money supply (Koch, 1997) .
One sign of the tightening of monetary policy was the increase in nominal interest rates even as i n flation declined and then held steady. In part, this suited the CNB because high interest rates not only s e r ved to deflate the economy, but also boosted comm e rcial banks' pro fit s, thus helping them to improve their capital positions. These high domestic intere s t ra t e s, combined with an exc h a n g e -rate peg that wa s c redible to fo re i g n e rs, attracted large inflows of fo reign capital. In part, such inflows we re the re s u l t of borrowing by Czech firms abroad, which, of c o u rs e, exposed them to danger if the koruna we re ever devalued. The bulk of capital inflows consisted of short-term portfolio investments driven by the d i f f e rential between Czech and West Euro p e a n i n t e rest ra t e s. Because the koruna appeared to be u n d e r valued, inve s to rs saw little danger of its deva luation and took adva n tage of the higher intere s t rates in the Czech Re p u b l i c. As a result of this mism a tch between the credibility of the ko r u n a 's peg and the high interest rates maintained by the CNB, short-term capital inflows began in 1993 and accele rated. By 1996, the surplus on the capital account was sufficient to more than offset a current account d e ficit that was in excess of 8 percent of GDP. The CNB engaged in massive, and costly, sterilization of these capital inflows.
To reduce capital inflows, on February 28, 1996, the CNB widened the intervention bands for the koruna from ±0.5 percent to ±7.5 percent. At firs t , this led to capital outflows and depreciation of the koruna within the widened band (Jílek and Jílkov á , 1998) , but the koruna sta b i l i zed quickly, and the CNB raised interest ra t e s, resulting in a re n ewal of capita l i n flows and a nominal appreciation of the ko r u n a t h rough February of 1997. On May 13, 1997, a s p e cu l a t i ve attack on the koruna began. This atta c k was brought about by political uncertainty over the fate of the Klaus government, by concerns about the C zech Re p u b l i c 's trade deficit and the fa i l u re of exports and output to grow, and by the inability of the government to use fiscal policy to address these f u n d a m e n tal problems (Begg, 1997, Brada and Ku ta n , 1999) . The CNB intervened in the fo reign exc h a n g e m a r ket to defend the koruna. It expended about $2.5 billion in re s e r ves during this episode, and short-term i n t e rest rates rose to 50 percent. Neve r t h e l e s s, by M ay 26, 1997, the Bank was fo rced to acknow l e d g e the end of the ko r u n a 's peg. The government, ra t h e r b e l a t e d l y, adopted a much more re s t r i c t i ve fis c a l p o l i cy to sta b i l i ze the situation. The koruna initially fell by 12 percent, but, during the first half of 1998, much of this loss was regained, due partly to improve d t rade performance and partly to the persistence of high interest ra t e s.
With the abandonment of the nominal exc h a n g e rate as its ta rget, the CNB at first proposed to fo l l ow a R E V I E W policy of informally pegging to the DM, but, in December 1998, the Bank announced a policy of i n flation ta rgeting. The inflation ta rget is set in terms of net inflation, a measure that excludes move m e n t s in regulated prices, which have been increasing quite rapidly during recent ye a rs, and the effects of indire c t ta xes and the elimination of subsidies. The Bank set both a "c o n t rol" ta rget of 5.5-6.5 percent for the end of 1998 and a thre e -year ta rget of 3.5-5.5 percent by the end of 2000 (Czech National Bank, 1998).
Hungary
Unlike the Czech Republic, which entered the transition with a low rate of inflation, Hungarian prices rose by about 15 percent in 1987 and 1988 and by nearly 30 percent in 1989, largely because of the ongoing liberalization of the Hungarian economy. As a result of this gradual liberalization, Hungarian consumer prices better reflected supply and demand and, consequently, the effects of a further freeing of prices in 1991 led to a relatively moderate upsurge in inflation (Figure 2) .
Hungary initially followed a gradualist macroeconomic policy that sought to balance the desire fo r reducing inflation with the need to control the government deficit and to service a large external debt. Too sharp a deflation would have reduced government revenues and increased expenditures on the social safety net, thus increasing the governments need to borrow abroad. Hungary adopted a fixed peg, with a number of small adjustments implemented during each year to account for the inflation differential between Hungary and the countries in its re f e rence baske t .
3 During the early 1990s, exc h a n g erate-policy aimed at a real appreciation of the fo r i n t to help combat domestic inflation, but, over time, this p o l i cy was seen as too costly because the declining c o m p e t i t i veness of Hungarian exports and sluggish g rowth. More over it failed to provide a nominal exc h a n g e -rate anchor for inflationary ex p e c ta t i o n s.
These costs began to show during 1993 when the current account deficit reached 9 percent of GDP and then increased to 9.6 percent the fo l l ow i n g year. At the same time, the government's budget deficit remained unacceptably high.
4 F i n a n c i n g this deficit re q u i red monetary expansion as we l l as high interest rates to attract commercial banks to government securities, thus fueling the inflation that the strong forint policy had sought to re d u c e. The persistence of these twin deficits c reated uncertainty among Hungary's fo re i g n c re d i to rs as well as concerns about the stability of the forint.
In March of 1995, the Hungarian gove r n m e n t adopted a major sta b i l i zation pro g ram that included a sharp reduction in government ex p e n d i t u res as well as tax incre a s e s. These reduced the fiscal defic i t f rom 9.6 percent of GDP in 1994 to 7.3 percent in 1995 and 4.6 percent in 1996.
5 The forint wa s d evalued during the first two months of the year and again just prior to the introduction of the sta b i l i za t i o n p a c ka g e. A crawling peg exc h a n g e -rate regime wa s announced. The initial rate of devaluation was 1.9 p e rcent per month, falling to 1.3 percent for the second half of 1995 and declining further there a f t e r (see Szapáry and Jaka b, 1998, Table 3 ). The deva l u ation of the forint, combined with the slackening of domestic demand caused by fiscal stringency, stimulated ex p o r t s, and, with the help of a tempora r y import surc h a rg e, reduced imports. As a result, the c u r rent account deficit as a perc e n tage of GDP fell f rom 9.4 percent in 1994 to 5.6 percent in 1995 and 2.2 percent in 1997. To slow the growth of wa g e s and to free energy prices, the government also adopted measures to accelerate priva t i za t i o n . 6 T h e rate of devaluation, preannounced in the craw l i n g peg regime through 1998, served as a more effective nominal anchor for monetary policy than had the p revious re g i m e. It also served to reduce speculation and the timing of fo reign exchange transactions to anticipate devaluation. Like the Czech Re p u b l i c, Hungary sterilized some of the inflows of short-term fo reign capital as interest rates rose during the posts ta b i l i zation period, but in smaller amounts and at l ower costs (Szapáry and Jaka b, 1998, pp. 70 6 -714) .
As Figure 1 shows, economic growth slowed as the result of these measure s, but it soon resumed and then accelerated. This growth has stra i n e d s o m ewhat the macroeconomic balance, and the current account deficit increased to 4.2 percent of GDP during 1998 while the fiscal deficit rose to 4.6 3 Between December 9, 1991, and May 16, 1994, the forint was pegged to a basket of 50 percent U.S. dollar and 50 percent ECU; from thereafter until March 16, 1995, it was pegged to 30 percent U.S. dollar and 70 p e rcent ECU. 4 The government deficit, including privatization receipts in revenue, was 6.7 percent in 1993 and 9.6 percent in 1994 on an accrual basis. 5 For the background on the discussions leading up to the design and adoption of the stabilization program, see Kornai (1997, Chs. 2-6) 6 Real wages fell by 12.0 percent during 1995 along with a further 5 percent decrease during 1996. p e rcent of GDP. Inflation has declined steadily, in part due to falling prices of imports and also because of the fo r i n t 's slowing rate of depreciation.
Poland
The sta b i l i zation of the Polish economy began under much less favo rable conditions than those found in the Czech Republic and Hungary. During 1989, inflation peaked at 54.8 percent per month, the government deficit was nearly 8 percent of GDP, and both loss-making Polish firms and the gove r nment deficit we re financed by the rapid expansion of m o n ey and credit. Although the government began to deal with the crisis in late 1989, major sta b i l i za t i o n began on January 1, 1990, with the introduction of the so-called Balcerowicz Plan. This plan had seve ra l c o m p o n e n t s. The zloty (zl) was devalued from 5,560 zl/$ to 9,500 zl/$ and pegged at the latter ra t e. Monetary and fiscal policies we re tightened, enabling the g overnment to achieve a surplus equivalent to 0.4 percent of GDP, and credit creation was sharply curta i l e d . The p o p i we k, a punitive tax on above -ave rage wa g e i n c re a s e s, was enacted to slow the growth of wa g e s.
The consequences of this, the first sta b i l i za t i o n and libera l i zation effort in a transition economy, we re s u f ficiently virulent-both in the upsurge in prices and in the decline of pro d u c t i o n -to lead to an easing of macroeconomic policy late in 1990. The effects of this policy change, howeve r, we re felt more in an a c c e l e ration of inflation than in real output grow t h ( Wellisz, 1997) , and the government soon abandoned this effort. As the recession deepened during 1991 , the fiscal deficit re a p p e a red and high inflation (see F i g u re 2) reduced the competitiveness of Po l i s h ex p o r t s. The zloty was devalued by 16.8 percent, and its peg was shifted to a basket of curre n c i e s.
Po l i cy priorities gradually shifted from sta b i l i zation to stimulating growth (Krzak, 1996) . Although the fiscal deficit was cut from 6 percent of GDP in 1992 to 2.8 percent in 1993, a level around which it has fluctuated since, monetary policy was re l a t i ve l y ex p a n s i o n a r y. While interest rates remained positive, m o n ey supply and credit growth consistently outpaced ta rgets set by the NBP. The zloty's peg wa s abandoned in October of 1991, replaced by a crawling peg with a preannounced devaluation of 1.8 p e rcent per month against a basket of curre n c i e s. O ver time, the rate of depreciation has been re d u c e d , and there also have been one-off devaluations and revaluations to accommodate exogenous shocks.
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During 1995, the band within which the zloty could fluctuate was widened to ±7 percent. Po l a n d 's exchange rate policy was sufficiently credible to fo reign inve s to rs that short-term capital inflows began to be a problem for the NBP by 1995, when, eve n with some NBP sterilization, capital inflows accounted for 59 percent of the growth of the money supply ( K r zak, 1996, p. 57) .
Although Poland has had the highest rate of inflat i o n of the three countries throughout the 1990s, it also has had the fastest growth of aggregate output. This m ay be due as much to its earlier start in implementing economic re forms as to better economic policy; just as its higher rate of inflation may better re flect its p re s ta b i l i zation situation rather than a poorer ability to re s t rain the growth of the money supply than displaye d by the other two countries considered in this paper. Re c e n t l y, this output growth has slowed somew h a t because of a fall in exports to Russia and the Ukra i n e, which is due to the financial crises in those countries. Because inflation has s l a c kened and because the nominal anchor of the crawling peg has decreased in i m p o r ta n c e with a further widening of the bands, Poland, like the Czech Re p u b l i c, has adopted infla t i o n ta rgeting as the fra m ework for its monetary policy. During 1998, the Monetary Po l i cy Council set a goal of lowering Polish inflation to 6.8-7.8 percent in 1999 and 4 percent as measured by the CPI, by the year 2003.
Lessons and Their Implications for Monetary Policy
All three countries have sta b i l i zed inflation at m o d e rate levels and, except for the recent re c e s s i o n in the Czech Re p u b l i c, succeeded in generating sustained growth. Although different initial conditions and the different starting times of sta b i l i zation prog rams resulted in somewhat different paths, the t ra j e c tories of their growth and inflation have conve rged. Indeed, by the second half of 1998, infla t i o n seemed to be falling towa rd single-digit levels in the t h ree countries. In the Czech Re p u b l i c, the monthly ye a r -o n -year rate of inflation as measured by the CPI fell to 6.8 percent in December 1998. In Hungary, the comparable fig u re was 10.5 percent, and in Po l a n d it was 8.6 percent. These harbingers of the end of double-digit inflation we re accurate only for the FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS 7 One reason for the fiscal turnaround was that inflation caused firms to overestimate their profits due to a failure to account properly for the effects of inflation on inventories. 8 See Koch (1997) for details. l e a d e rs of the two major parties met with the governor of the CNB and criticized him for the Bank's fa i l u re to pay sufficient attention to employment and output in its policy decisions. In Poland, the Bank is concerned not only about the inflation ta rget, but also the nominal exchange ra t e. This is due larg e l y to considerations surrounding Po l a n d 's pro s p e c t i ve entry into the EU.
A second pre requisite is that there be no fis c a l d o m i n a n c e, meaning that the central bank's policy not be dictated by the need to finance the fiscal defic i t of the government. Again, de jure, both countries h ave safeguards against the central bank being fo rc e d to finance the government. Neve r t h e l e s s, in re a l i t yand especially if we consider the banking system as a whole-this becomes a troublesome issue. In Po l a n d , the seignorage to GDP ratio has been re l a t i vely high by international sta n d a rd s. In the Czech Re p u b l i c, c o m m e rcial banks do not re c e i ve interest on re q u i re d re s e r ve s, another form of revenue for the gove r n m e n t . As mentioned above, the commercial banking sector in both countries has tended to have a healthy appetite for government debt at the expense of lending to the business secto r. Thus the de jure ability of the centra l banks to avoid having to finance the government may be subverted by the commercial banks' evident willingness to do so. F i n a l l y, central banks fo l l owing an infla t i o nta rgeting policy should avoid other nominal ta rg e t s. In the case of Poland, the intervention bands for the zloty are quite wide, but, as mentioned above, the z l o t y 's exchange rate continues to be pegged to the U.S. dollar and to the Euro. The Czech Re p u b l i c 's koruna officially flo a t s, but it is quite possible that the CNB maintains an informal peg to the DM and i n t e r venes in the market to support this unsta t e d p e g . T h u s, both central banks may well face confli c t s b e t ween alternative nominal goals in the future.
It is too early to pass judgment on the e f f e c t i veness of inflation ta rgeting in the t wo countries. During the first half of 1999, i n flation in the Czech Republic was below the ta rget ra n g e, largely due to the recession fro m which the country is re c overing very slow l y. In Poland the inflation during mid-1999 was at or a b ove the upper limit of the NBP's forecast. These potential fa i l u res to achieve inflation goals do not mean that inflation ta rgeting cannot be a wo r ka b l e p o l i cy regime in the longer term. Neve r t h e l e s s, t h e re is a danger that either undershooting and ove rshooting inflation ta rgets may convince the population that their central banks have little impact on the rate of inflation, thus undermining p o l i cy cre d i b i l i t y.
CONCLUSIONS
The Czech Re p u b l i c, Hungary and Poland have made considerable pro g ress in stabilizing and libera lizing their economies. Monetary policy has made a s i g n i ficant contribution to sta b i l i zation and there has been a re m a r kable development in these countries' financial institutions and marke t s. Neve r t h e l e s s, the re l a t i ve newness and fragility of these markets and institutions is of concern because of the heav y b u rden placed on monetary authorities battling to reduce inflation. It will be important to continue to s t rengthen the capital market in these countries and to provide more active fiscal policy support for mone tary policy.
